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Time Is Money—An Argument for Expedient Review of Bankruptcy Cases 
Robert Nuse* 
 
I.  Introduction 
 The Constitution grants Congress the power to establish uniform bankruptcy laws in the 
United States.1  Although James Madison believed that this power was so intertwined with 
Congress’s power to regulate and would be a strong enough prophylactic on potential bankruptcy 
petitioners’ ability to perpetrate frauds that the wisdom of granting Congress this power would not 
be called into question,2 had Madison any idea of the number of businesses and individuals who 
would come to seek bankruptcy protection every year, he likely would have referred to these 
statistics in arguing the necessity of granting Congress this power.3  Eighty percent of businesses 
fail in their first year.4  Of those that make it past their first year, approximately half make it to 
their fifth.5  One third will last ten years.6  During the fiscal year ending on September 30, 2016, 
there were 805,580 total bankruptcy petitions filed by individuals and businesses in the Bankruptcy 
courts.7  For comparison, in that same period, 291,851 civil cases were brought in the district 
courts, and 77,357 criminal proceedings were brought.8  It should come as no surprise, therefore, 
that the Supreme Court has regularly issued writs of certiorari in bankruptcy disputes to provide 
                                                 
* J.D. Candidate, 2019, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., summa cum laude, 2011, Monmouth University.  
I would like to thank my editors, Professor Stephen Lubben, Joseph DiCarlo, and Catherine Soliman for their help 
and support in writing this Comment. 
1 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
2 THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 260 (James Madison) (Garry Wills ed., 2003). 
3 See generally Stephen Lubben, A New Understanding of the Bankruptcy Clause, 64 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 319 
(2013) (explaining that many of Madison’s Jeffersonian-Republican allies did not understand Article I, Section 8, 
Clause 4 as granting Congress exclusive authority to pass bankruptcy laws, and instead argued that this power was 
reserved to the States).  See also Andrew B. Dawson, Better Than Bankruptcy?, 69 RUTGERS L. REV. 137 (2016) 
(discussing the possibility of parallel state and federal bankruptcy laws). 
4 Cf. Keith Speights, Success Rate: What Percentage of Businesses Fail in Their First Year?, USA TODAY (May 21, 
2017), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/small-business-central/2017/05/21/what-percentage-of-
businesses-fail-in-their-first-year/101260716/. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
7 Judicial Business, 2016, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/judicial-business-2016. 
8 Id. 
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guidance on issues of statutory and constitutional interpretation.9 
 On March 27, 2017, the Supreme Court issued a writ of certiorari to the Ninth Circuit in 
the case of U.S. Bank National Association v. Village at Lakeridge.10  Although the petitioner, U.S. 
Bank National Association11 raised three issues on appeal, the Supreme Court granted certiorari 
only as to the second. 12  In the words of the petitioner, the Supreme Court agreed to decide  
[w]hether the appropriate standard of review for determining non-statutory insider 
status is the de novo standard of review applied by the Third, Seventh and Tenth 
Circuit Courts of Appeal, or the clearly erroneous standard of review adopted for 
the first time by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal in this action.13 
 
 Although the respondent and amicus curiae argued the question did not merit review,14 the 
Court was presumably swayed by the petitioner’s assertion that the dispute raised important 
questions about the correct interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code, which will impact both Title 11 
bankruptcy disputes and commercial transactions.15  In the Petition for the Writ, the petitioner 
argued that the case would serve as an effective vehicle for the Court to resolve a Circuit split 
regarding the proper standard of review for determining whether a lower court has correctly 
classified a party to a bankruptcy as a “non-statutory insider.”16  The petitioner further argued that 
a decision by the Supreme Court would impact many areas of bankruptcy and fraudulent 
conveyance law.17  
                                                 
9 E.g., Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 137 S. Ct. 973 (2017); Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. 122 (1819). 
10 137 S. Ct. 1372 (2017). 
11 By and through CW Captial Asset Management, LLC.  For the sake of clarity, this Comment shall refer to this party 
as either “the petitioner” or “debtor.” 
12 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Vill. at Lakeridge, 138 S. Ct. 960 (2018); 137 S. Ct. at 
1327. 
13 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 12, at i. 
14 Brief for the Respondent in Opposition at 11–16, U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Vill. at Lakeridge, 138 S. Ct. 960 (2018); 
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 12–16, U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Vill. at 
Lakeridge, 138 S. Ct. 960 (2018). 
15 Reply Brief for Petitioner in Response to Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae at 1, U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n 
v. Vill. at Lakeridge, 138 S. Ct. 960 (2018). 
16 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 12, at 19. 
17 Id. 
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 Beyond the issues raised by the parties, however, is the ripple effect that each of the 
Supreme Court’s decisions on issues of statutory interpretation has upon the jurisprudence of the 
larger field.  Each decision implicates not just the Bankruptcy Code,18 but arguably the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, and canons of appellate review.  
Of all of these rules, the one most heavily implicated is Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52, which 
provides in relevant part that “[f]indings of fact, . . . must not be aside unless clearly erroneous, 
and the reviewing court must give due regard to the trial court’s opportunity to judge the witnesses’ 
credibility.”19  The Rules Advisory Committee has noted that Rule 52 bolsters the legitimacy and 
credibility of the district courts,20 a conclusion with which the Supreme Court has agreed.21   The 
implications of Rule 52(a), however, reach beyond the ambit of appellate-trial court relations.  For 
instance, in Cooper v. Harris,22 the Supreme Court reaffirmed (or at least favorably cited) the 
plurality decision in Hernandez v. New York,23 which adopted a state court’s findings of fact, 
subject to review for clear error under Rule 52(a), as a matter of federalism.24  The Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit has also deferred to the judgments of the district courts in the realm 
of international relations, and reviews the decisions of the district courts to extend comity to the 
courts of foreign jurisdictions on an abuse of discretion basis.25  Although one may distinguish 
notions of comity from findings of fact and a court’s resolution of factual disputes, the Second 
Circuit distinguished comity as principle of convenience and expediency, implicitly recognizing 
                                                 
18 Cf. generally Leif M. Clark, The Ripple Effect, 20-6 AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE JOURNAL 31 (July/Aug. 
2001). 
19 FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6). 
20 Cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a) advisory committee’s note to 1985 amendment. 
21 E.g. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 837 (2015). 
22 137 S. Ct. 1455 (2017). 
23 500 U.S. 352 (1991). 
24 Cooper, 137 S. Ct. at 1468 (citing Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 369). 
25 See Corporación Mexicana de Maintenimiento Integral, S. De R.L. De C.V. v. Pemex-Exploración y Producción, 
832 F.3d 92, 100 (2d Cir. 2016). 
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and sanctioning the division of labor between the trial courts charged with resolving questions of 
fact and the appellate courts charged with resolving of questions of law. 26   
 Any determination by the Supreme Court in this case, whether the Court decides to 
empower the trial courts or to concentrate more power in the hands of the appellate courts, is likely 
to impact areas of the law outside of bankruptcy.  Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. once wrote that 
“[t]he reports of a given jurisdiction in the course of a generation take up pretty much the whole 
body of the law, and restate it from the present point of view.  We could reconstruct the corpus 
from them if all that went before were burned.”27  In other words, the work of restating the law is 
a generational project in which each reported decision plays it part.  By agreeing to decide this 
case, the Roberts Court may further develop current jurisprudence on the topic. 
 This Comment will proceed as follows.  Part II will discuss the relevant statute28 and its 
legislative history, and the framework the Courts of Appeals follow when analyzing, interpreting, 
and applying the statute.  For illustration, this Comment will analyze the Tenth Circuit’s 
application of this framework in its decision in Anstine v. Carl Zeiss Meditec AG (In re U.S. 
Medical, Inc.).29  Part III will then introduce the Ninth Circuit case which precipitated the 
controversy, U.S. Bank National Association v. Village at Lakeridge, LLC. (In re Village at 
Lakeridge, LLC.)30  Part IV will summarize the substantive arguments advanced by the parties to 
the case and the United States as a friend of the Court.  Finally, Part V will argue that the Court 
should follow the path laid out by the Respondent and best articulated by the United States.  Part 
VI briefly concludes. 
                                                 
26 See id. at 106 (quoting Somportex Ltd. v. Phila. Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 440 (3d Cir. 1971)). 
27 Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 458 (1897).   
28 Bankruptcy Reform Act, 11 U.S.C. § 101(31) (2012). 
29 531 F.3d 1272 (10th Cir. 2008). 
30 814 F.3d 993 (9th Cir. 2016), aff’d, 138 S. Ct. 960 (2018). 
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II.  Statutory Framework 
A. Analysis of the Relevant Statute 
 Before deciding the proper appellate standard for review for a bankruptcy court’s 
determination that an individual or entity is an insider, it is necessary to determine who is an insider 
for the purposes of approving a reorganization plan.  The relevant statute is section 101 of the 
Bankruptcy Reform Act.31  Two sections of Title 11 provide definitions and rules of construction, 
respectively. 32  Section 101 spells out the definitions that apply to Title 11 (Bankruptcy), and 
section 102 provides Rules of Construction.33  At issue in Lakeridge is whether an individual may 
be classified as what the bankruptcy courts refer to as a “non-statutory insider.”34  Before defining 
this term of art, however, it is useful to discuss its congressionally-defined doppelganger, 
“statutory insiders.” 
 Section 101(31) defines the term “insider.”35  The definition is divided into six sections, 
labelled (A)–(F).  Section 101(31) begins by stating, “[t]he term ‘insider’ includes . . . .”36  The 
subsection is then subdivided into individuals, corporations, partnerships, elected officials of a 
municipality, affiliates of the debtor, and managing agents of the debtor.37  The Code enumerates 
under each subsection individuals who qualify as insiders for the purpose of the statute.38  Persons 
who fit into one of the classes of people enumerated by Congress are counted by courts as 
“statutory” or “per se” insiders.39  The legislative history of section 101(31) states that statutory 
                                                 
31 11 U.S.C. § 101(31). 
32 §§ 101(31), 102(3). 
33 § 102. 
34 Lakeridge, 137 S. Ct. at 1327; 814 F.3d at 996.  E.g. Speier v. Argent Mgmt., LLC (In re Palmdale Hills Prop., 
Inc.), No. 8:08-bk-17206-ES, 2017 WL 4573691, at *5 (Bankr. C.D. Cal., Oct. 12, 2017). 
35 11 U.S.C. § 101(31). 
36  Id. 
37 §§ 101(31)(A)–(F). 
38 See §§ 101(31)(A)–(F). 
39 E.g., Lakeridge, 814 F.3d at 999; Longview Aluminum, LLC v. Brandt (In re Longview Aluminum, LLC), 657 
F.3d 507, 509 (7th Cir. 2011). 
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insiders are presumed to have “a sufficiently close relationship with the debtor that [their] conduct 
is made subject to closer scrutiny than those dealing at arm’s length with the debtor.”40  The circuit 
courts have defined an arm’s length transaction as one made by parties acting in good faith, in the 
ordinary course of business, and intended to serve independent interests.41   
 Notably, when creating these lists of statutory insiders, Congress chose to use the word 
“includes.”42  This word was not accompanied by any limiting language.43  Courts, therefore, have 
presumed that Congress’s list of insiders is not exhaustive, and that others may qualify as insiders.  
These people and entities are called “non-statutory insiders.”44  “Non-statutory insiders” have been 
defined as “those entities[or persons] which, while not listed in the statutory definition, have a 
sufficiently close relationship with [the] debtor that their conduct is made subject to closer scrutiny 
than those dealing at arm’s length with debtor . . . .”45  The crux of the analysis, therefore, is a 
close relationship between the creditor and debtor, such that a court may presume that the two are 
not truly dealing at arm’s length.46 
 As stated above, this category of non-statutory insiders is a product of judicial 
interpretation of legislative language.47  More specifically, the recognition of this class of insiders 
is a function of the courts’ interpretation of Congress’s language in § 101(31), and of Congress’s 
intent in both carving out a class of insiders and choosing to use the word “include” in § 101(31).  
                                                 
40 S. REP. No. 95-989, at 25 (1977), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5810; see, e.g., Lakeridge, 814 at 999; 
Longview Aluminum, 657 F.3d at 509. 
41 Anstine v. Carl Zeiss Meditec AG (In re U.S. Med., Inc.), 531 F.3d 1272, 1277 n.4 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Arm’s-
Length Transaction, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 109 (6th ed. 1990)).  Arm’s-Length, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th 
ed. 2014) (“Of, relating to, or involving dealings between two parties who are not related or not on close terms and 
who are presumed to have roughly equal bargaining power; not involving a confidential relationship”).   See also 
Shubert v. Lucent Techs., Inc. (In re Winstar Comms., Inc.), 554 F.3d 382, 399 (3d Cir. 2009). 
42 Bankruptcy Reform Act, 11 U.S.C. §101(31) (2012). 
43 Cf. id. 
44 E.g., Weinman v. Walker (In re Adams Aircraft Indus.), 805 F.3d 888, 894 (10th Cir. 2015).   
45 U.S. Med., 531 F.3d at 1276 (quoting Rupp v. United Sec. Bank (In re Kunz), 489 F.3d 1072, 1078-79 (10th Cir. 
2007)). 
46 U.S. Med., 531 F.3d at 1280.  For definitions of “arm’s length,” see supra note 4141 and accompanying text.  
47 E.g., Adams Aircraft Indus, 805 F.3d at 894. 
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Congress did not define the word “include,” but it did provide a relevant rule of construction.  
Section 102(3) of the Bankruptcy Reform Act is the “Rules of Construction” section of Title 11.  
In that section, Congress clarified that “‘includes’ and ‘including’ are not limiting.”48  Black’s Law 
Dictionary provides further clarification, defining “include” as, “[t]o contain as a part of 
something.  The participle [‘]including[’] typically indicates a partial list . . . .”49  The Supreme 
Court has approved of recourse to lay and legal dictionaries when the Bankruptcy Code is unclear, 
instructing lower courts that they may consult dictionaries and the Bankruptcy Rules to shed light 
upon the meanings of words not defined in the Code itself.50  Of the many dictionaries courts have 
referred to, Black’s Law Dictionary is especially authoritative and persuasive.51  Alexander 
Hamilton provided additional guidance in the Federalist, wherein he reminded his readers that 
legal interpretation must always be guided by common sense, and that the worth of an 
interpretation may be judged by its fidelity to its source.52  Occam’s razor is as incisive in legal 
interpretation as it is in philosophical musing. 
                                                 
48 § 102(3). 
49 Include, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
50 Schwab v. Reilly, 560 U.S. 770, 783 (2010) (citing  Rousey v. Jacoway, 544 U.S. 320, 330 (2005)). 
51 See Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier & Samuel A. Thumma, Scaling the Lexicon Fortress: The United States Supreme Court’s 
Use of Dictionaries in the Twenty-First Century, 94 MARQ. L.  REV. 77, 83 (2010) (“Justices of the United States 
Supreme Court have used more than 120 different dictionaries in their opinions . . . .  [T]he most widely cited law 
dictionary is Black’s Law Dictionary”).  But see Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory 
Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 61, 67 (1994) (“I want to reemphasize what should be obvious.  ‘Plain 
meaning’ as a way to understand language is silly.  In interesting cases, meaning is not ‘plain;’ it must be imputed; 
and the choice among meanings must have a footing more solid that [sic] a dictionary—which is a museum of words, 
an historical catalog rather than a means to decode the work of legislatures.  Any theory of meaning must be 
jurisprudential.”); John F. Manning, The New Purposivism, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 113, 177–78 (2011) (“Because of the 
vastness of linguistic experience and the limited time and resources of editors, no dictionary can capture every shred 
of nuance or each idiosyncratic meaning a word may acquire when combined with others.  Nor can a dictionary tell 
the interpreter which among multiple competing senses of a word Congress intended to use.  No one—not even the 
staunchest textualist—believes that the role of the dictionary in interpretation is straightforward, formulaic, or without 
complication.”); Richard A. Posner, The Incoherence of Antonin Scalia, NEW REPUBLIC (Aug. 24, 2012), 
https://newrepublic.com/article/106441/scalia-garner-reading-the-law-textual-originalism (“[There] are more 
persuasive points than the dictionary’s definition . . . .  Dictionaries are mazes in which judges are soon lost.  A 
dictionary-centered textualism is hopeless.”). 
52 THE FEDERALIST No. 83, at 506 (Alexander Hamilton) (Garry Wills, ed., 2003). 
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 Congress did not intend to create an exhaustive list of insiders in drafting and enacting  
§ 101(31).  Courts infer this intent because Congress’s use of the word “includes” is nonexclusive 
on its face, and the Rules of Construction provided by § 102(3) further support an expansive 
reading.53  A fair interpretation of § 102(3) thus compels the conclusion Congress did not intend 
to create a list of exclusive categories.  Instead, Congress provided sample categories which are 
meant to serve as illustrations, and not as an exhaustive list.54  Although fairly implied by  
§ 101(31), the Code itself does not explicitly define “non-statutory insider.”55  Because a non-
statutory classification exists beyond the scope of a statute, the definition of such a classification 
is left to the courts.  As of April 2018, the Supreme Court has not defined the term “non-statutory 
insider” in the context of § 101(31), or generally for the purposes of a bankruptcy proceeding.  The 
task, therefore has been left to the Circuit Courts of Appeals.  According to the leading treatise, 
Collier on Bankruptcy, the inquiry boils down to whether the creditor’s business dealings with the 
debtors were conducted at arm’s length.56  Examination of relevant case law is instructive.57 
B.  Illustrative Case, U.S. Medical, Inc. 
 In U.S. Med., the Tenth Circuit was asked to review the determination of a bankruptcy 
court, reversed by a bankruptcy appellate panel, that an entity was a non-statutory insider.58  The 
facts upon which the bankruptcy court made its determination were not in dispute by the time the 
case reached the Tenth Circuit.59  The debtor, U.S. Medical, Inc., distributed new and used medical 
equipment, and the creditor, Carl Zeiss AG, was a German company that produced surgical 
                                                 
53 See COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 101.31 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed.). 
54 Rupp v. United Sec. Bank (In re Kunz), 489 F.3d 1072, 1078-79 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting In re Krehl, 86 F.3d 737, 
741 (7th Cir.1996)). 
55 See generally 11 U.S.C. § 101(31). 
56 COLLIER, supra note 53. 
57 Id. 
58 Anstine v. Carl Zeiss Meditec AG (In re U.S. Med., Inc.), 531 F.3d 1272, 1273-74 (10th Cir. 2008). 
59 Id. at 1274. 
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equipment and aesthetic lasers.60  The debtor became the creditor’s exclusive distributor in North 
America, and the creditor became the debtor’s exclusive manufacturer of lasers.61  As part of this 
“strategic alliance,” inter alia, the creditor had the right to appoint a member of the debtor’s board 
of directors, and acquired a 10.6% ownership stake in the debtor.62  The creditor appointed Dr. 
Bernard Seitz, its CEO, to the debtor’s board of directors, pursuant to the parties’ agreement.63  Dr. 
Seitz attended every meeting of the board, either in person or by telephone.64  Although Dr. Seitz 
had access to all of the debtor’s financial information, he never cast a vote in any decision 
regarding a payment to the creditor.65  All day-to-day financial interactions between the creditor 
and the debtor were handled for the creditor by another individual.66 
 After experiencing financial difficulties, the debtor voluntarily filed for Chapter 7 
bankruptcy.67  In a subsequent adversary proceeding between the former partners, the Trustee 
invoked section 547(b)(4)(B) and sought to avoid certain transfers, claiming that the creditor was 
an insider within the scope of section 101(31).68  The bankruptcy court agreed with this assertion, 
finding that the creditor was a non-statutory insider in the context of section 101(31) because of 
the “extreme closeness” between debtor and creditor. 69  The bankruptcy court reached this 
decision despite finding no evidence that Dr. Seitz controlled or sought to control the debtor, or 
sought to exercise any kind of undue influence upon the debtor.70  Upon appeal, the bankruptcy 
appellate panel reversed, pointing out that not all creditors and debtors who happen to have some 
                                                 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
64 U.S. Med., 531 F.3d at 1274. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. (citing Bankruptcy Reform Act §§ 547(b)(4)(B), 101(31)). 
69 Id.   
70 U.S. Med., 531 F.3d at 1274.  
Time Is Money—An Argument for Expedient Review of Bankruptcy Cases 
11 
 
sort of close relationship are to be counted as insiders simply by dint of their closeness.71 
 The Tenth Circuit’s opinion began by declaring the appropriate standard of review.72  First, 
the Tenth Circuit stated that it was the court’s duty to independently review the decision of the 
bankruptcy court, and not the decision of the bankruptcy appellate panel.73  The court agreed with 
the appellate panel that a whether a creditor is a non-statutory insider is typically a question of 
fact.74  Because the facts of the case at bar, however, were previously settled or admitted, and all 
that remained was to draw a legal conclusion from those facts, the court found that the question it 
confronted was a mixed one of law and fact, in which legal aspects predominated.75  Thus, the 
court concluded that de novo review was the appropriate standard.76   
 The Tenth Circuit relied on Title 11’s Rules of Construction and In re Kunz77 to bolster its 
analysis of the two categories of insiders created by section 101(31). 78  The Tenth Circuit observed 
that each of the two categories of insiders (statutory and non-statutory insiders) “is based on either 
one of two relational classifications.”79  The first class is statutory or per se insiders.80  These are 
individuals or entities for whom, on account of “affinity or consanguinity,”81 Congress has created 
a conclusive presumption of preferential treatment by the debtor.82  In other words, “[t]he per se 
insider is considered to be close enough to the debtor to demand preferential treatment as a matter 
of law, regardless of whether the insider has any actual control over the actions of the debtor.”83   
                                                 
71 Id. at 1275 (citing In re U.S. Med., Inc., 370 B.R. 340, 345 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2007)). 
72 U.S. Med., 531 F.3d at 1275. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. at 1275. 
77 Rupp v. United Sec. Bank (In re Kunz), 489 F.3d 1072 (10th Cir. 2007) 
78 Bankruptcy Reform Act, 11 U.S.C. § 102(3) (2012). 
79 U.S. Med., 531 F.3d at 1275 (quoting Kunz, 489 F.3d at 1078-79). 
80 U.S. Med., 531 F.3d at 1275. 
81 Id. (quoting Kunz, 489 F.3d at 1074-75). 
82 Id. 
83 Id. at 1277 (quoting Kunz, 489 F.3d at 1079). 
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 The Court determined quickly that the creditor was not a statutory insider.84  First, the 
Tenth Circuit determined that the creditor did not fit any of the categories listed by Congress in 
section 101(31).85  Centering the inquiry on the issue of control, the Tenth Circuit ruled that absent 
a creditor’s exercise of some degree of direct control over the functions of its debtor, a creditor 
could not be counted as a statutory insider.86  Accordingly, because the creditor did not exercise 
control over U.S. Medical, Inc., and Dr. Seitz did not vote in any board meeting regarding a 
payment to the creditor, there was no further reason for the court to conclude that the creditor was 
a statutory insider.87  The court did not address, however, whether the creditor became a statutory 
insider of debtor under section 101(31)(B)(i) by virtue of  Dr. Seitz’s service on debtor’s board of 
directors.88  The bankruptcy appellate panel’s opinion is similarly silent on that issue.89  There are 
at least two possible explanations for this disposition.  First, the argument simply may not have 
been made by the debtor and was considered waived.   Second, and more likely, is that although 
Dr. Seitz did serve on debtor’s board of directors, Dr. Seitz himself was not debtor’s creditor.  The 
authorities have consistently interpreted section 101(31)(B)(i) to refer to natural persons.90  In 
keeping with this working definition of “director,” it is not possible for a corporation, such as 
creditor, to serve as a “director” for purposes of section 101(31)(B)(i).  Creditor, thus, did not 
become a statutory insider of debtor because of its agent’s service on debtor’s board of directors. 
 The second class is non-statutory insiders.91  Here, a finding of insider status is similarly 
based upon a relationship between the creditor and the debtor which is close enough to compel the 
                                                 
84 See id. at 1278-79. 
85 See Id. at 1280. 
86 Cf. id. at 1278 n.5.  
87 See id. at 1280. 
88 Cf. id. 
89 Cf. In re U.S. Med., Inc., 370 B.R. 340 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2007). 
90 E.g., Rupp v. United Sec. Bank (In re Kunz), 489 F.3d 1072, 1077 (10th Cir. 2007); In re Glob. Aviation Holdings, 
478 B.R. 142, 147-48 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2012); In re Borders Grp., Inc., 453 B.R. 459, 468 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
91 U.S. Med., 531 F.3d at 1276 
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conclusion that the creditor may gain an advantage simply because of the affinity between the 
parties.92  Relying on the legislative history of section 101(31),93 the Tenth Circuit adopted the 
Seventh Circuit’s conclusion in Krehl94 that, in determining non-statutory insider status, a court 
must look not only to the relationship between the parties, but also to the parties’ conduct, with an 
eye for whether the transactions between them were conducted at arm’s length.95 
 The Tenth Circuit formulated its two-part test for “non-statutory insider” status 
accordingly.  The first step of the inquiry is a factual one, and requires a court to determine whether 
there is a close relationship between the creditor and the debtor.96  Second, the court must 
determine whether there is anything other than closeness between the parties that suggests that any 
transactions between the parties were not, in fact, conducted at arm’s length.97  The Tenth Circuit 
clarified that the relationship between parties need not only be close, “but also at less than arm’s 
length.”98  Thus, when determining whether a party is a non-statutory insider, the court must 
examine both the larger relationship between the parties, and specific transactions between the 
parties.  Presumably, a party may, in theory, be a non-statutory insider regarding a specific 
transaction or series of transactions, without all transactions between the parties being so tainted.  
 As part of its de novo review of the Bankruptcy Court’s determination that the creditor was 
a non-statutory insider, the Tenth Circuit applied the aforementioned test to the Bankruptcy 
Court’s findings of fact.99  Although the Tenth Circuit implicitly credited the Bankruptcy Court’s 
finding that there was a close relationship between the parties such as to satisfy the first prong of 
                                                 
92 Id. at 1276 (quoting Kunz, 489 F.3d at 1074-75). 
93 See S. REP. No. 95-989, at 25 (1977), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 58105. 
94 In re Krehl, 86 F.3d 737, 742 (7th Cir.1996).   
95 U.S. Med., 531 F.3d at 1277 (quoting Krehl, 86 F.3d at 742).   
96 U.S. Med., 531 F.3d at 1277. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. at 1278. 
99 Id. 
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the test, the Tenth Circuit held that the Bankruptcy Court erred by failing to apply the second prong 
of the test.100  Had the bankruptcy court done so, the court would not have found that the creditor 
was a non-statutory insider because none of the transactions between the parties were conducted 
at less than arm’s length, and the creditor did not exert control or undue influence over the 
debtor.101  The Tenth Circuit implied that without any such inappropriate transactions, a party 
could not be found to be a non-statutory insider.102  The Tenth Circuit thus affirmed the decision 
of the bankruptcy appellate panel, and found that the creditor was not a non-statutory insider.103 
 With the statutory framework established and an example of its application provided,104 
the next section will discuss the Ninth Circuit decision which gave rise to the current controversy, 
In re Lakeridge.105 
III.  The Current Case—Lakeridge 
 The debtor Village at Lakeridge, had one member, MBP Equity Partners.106  MBP was 
managed by a five-person board of directors, one of whom was Kathie Bartlett.  Bartlett shared a 
close business and personal relationship with Dr. Robert Rabkin.107  At the time the debtor filed 
for bankruptcy, two companies held claims on debtor’s assets.108  U.S. Bank had a claim for $10 
million, and MBP had a claim for $2.76 million.109  MBP decided to sell its unsecured claim.110  
Bartlett approached Rabkin with an offer to sell MBP’s claim to him.111  Rabkin purchased the 
                                                 
100 Id. 
101 U.S. Med., 531 F.3d at 1278. 
102 Id. at 1280 (quoting Rupp v. United Sec. Bank (In re Kunz), 489 F.3d 1072, 1079 (10th Cir. 2007)). 
103 See U.S. Med., 531 F.3d at 1282. 
104 See generally Shubert v. Lucent Techs., Inc. (In re Winstar Comms., Inc.), 554 F.3d 382 (3d Cir. 2009) (where 
although the creditor did not exercise actual control over debtor, because creditor exerted undue influence over debtor 
and their transactions were at less than arm’s length, creditor was a non-statutory insider). 
105 814 F.3d 993 (9th Cir. 2016), aff’d, 138 S. Ct. 960 (2018). 
106 Id. at 996-97. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. at 997. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. 
111 Lakeridge, 814 F.3d at 997. 
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claim for $5000.112  U.S. Bank deposed Rabkin, and questioned him about his relationship with 
Lakeridge, MBP, and Bartlett.113  Rabkin testified that he had no knowledge of or relationship with 
Lakeridge or MBP, but admitted that he did have a close relationship with Bartlett, and that he saw 
her regularly.114  Rabkin testified that he purchased MBP’s claim solely as an investment, one 
which he characterized as risky.115 
 U.S. Bank moved to designate Rabkin’s claim, and bar him from casting a vote on the 
reorganization plan.116  U.S. Bank argued that Rabkin was both a statutory and a non-statutory 
insider under 11 U.S.C. § 101(31).117  In determining whether Rabkin was a statutory insider, the 
bankruptcy court evaluated both MBP’s relationship with Lakeridge, and Rabkin’s relationship 
with Lakeridge.118  The bankruptcy court determined that insider status could attach to a claim, 
and be imputed to an assignee thereof, and that if a statutory insider sold or assigned a claim to a 
non-insider party, that second party would become a statutory insider as a matter of law.119  In 
determining whether Rabkin was a non-statutory insider, the bankruptcy court evaluated a number 
of criteria, including whether Rabkin exercised control over Lakeridge, the closeness of Rabkin’s 
relationship with Bartlett and whether he purchased gifts for her or paid her bills and living 
expenses, and whether Bartlett exercised control over Rabkin and whether she purchased gifts for 
him or paid his bills and living expenses.120  The bankruptcy court found that Rabkin was not a 
non-statutory insider because the above-mentioned criteria were not satisfied.121  The bankruptcy 
                                                 
112 Id. 
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court, however, did find that Rabkin was a statutory insider.122  Because Rabkin had acquired the 
claim from MBP, an insider, Rabkin had become an insider by virtue of this acquisition of MBP’s 
claim.123  On appeal, the bankruptcy appellate panel affirmed the bankruptcy court’s finding that 
Rabkin was not a non-statutory insider, but reversed its finding that Rabkin was a statutory insider, 
explaining that insider status cannot be imputed through sale or assignment, but must instead be 
determined on a case-by-case basis. 124 
 The Ninth Circuit began its disposition of the case by declaring the applicable standard of 
review.125  The Ninth Circuit declared that it reviewed a bankruptcy court’s determination that a 
person is a statutory insider de novo.126  Next, the Ninth Circuit implied that questions of 
assignment are questions of law, subject to de novo review.127  The Ninth Circuit further stated 
that “[e]stablishing the definition of non-statutory insider status is . . . a purely legal inquiry,”128 
again subject to de novo review.129  Finally, the Ninth Circuit classified the determination of 
whether an individual or entity qualifies as a non-statutory insider under that definition is a 
question of fact, subject to review only for clear error.130 
 The Ninth Circuit determined that Rabkin was neither a statutory nor a non-statutory 
                                                 
122 Id. 
123 Lakeridge, 814 F.3d at 998. 
124 Id. (internal citation omitted). 
125 Id. at 999. 
126 Id. 
127 Lakeridge, 814 F.3d at 999 (citing Miller Ave. Prof’l & Promot’l Servs. v. Brady (In re Enter. Acquis’n Partners), 
319 B.R. 626, 630 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2004)). 
128 Lakeridge, 814 F.3d at 999. (citing Stahl v. Simon (In re Adamson Apparel, Inc.), 785 F.3d 1285, 1289 (9th Cir. 
2015)). 
129 Lakeridge, 814 F.3d at 999 (citing In re Adamson Apparel, Inc., 785 F.3d at 1289). 
130 Lakeridge, 814 F.3d at 999. (citing Friedman v. Shelia Plotsky Brokers, Inc. (In re Friedman), 126 B.R. 63, 70 
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1991); In re Adamson Apparel, 785 F.3d at 1289.  This Ninth Circuit rule appears to derive from In 
re Uvas Farming Corp., 89 B.R. 889, 892 (Bankr. D.N.M 1988), in which the District of New Mexico’s Bankruptcy 
Court held that “[t]he determination of insider status is a question of fact.  The definitions in 11 U.S.C. § 101(30)(B) 
are flexible and must be found on a case-by-case basis.  ‘Control,’ then, has no fixed definition, but is often defined 
by example and by an examination of the facts.”  This holding will be discussed later in this Comment. 
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insider.131  In disposing of the claim that Rabkin was a statutory insider, the Ninth Circuit held that 
a person or entity does not become a statutory insider merely by acquiring a claim from such a 
party.132  Rather, insider status may attach only to a claimant, and may not be assessed as a property 
of a particular claim.133  In reaching this conclusion, the Ninth Circuit conducted a grammatical 
analysis.  The Ninth Circuit declared that “‘insider,’ as used in the Bankruptcy Code, is a noun, 
referring to a person . . . .  The term ‘insider’ is not . . . an adjective used to describe the property 
of a claim.”134  Rabkin, therefore, did not become a statutory insider solely by acquiring an 
insider’s claim.135  Because there was no other basis upon which to find that Rabkin was a statutory 
insider, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Rabkin was not a statutory insider.136 
 The Ninth Circuit reviewed the bankruptcy court’s determination that Rabkin was not a 
non-statutory insider under the clear error standard of review.137  The Ninth Circuit determined 
that non-statutory insider status is a question of fact.138  In assessing Rabkin’s non-statutory status 
or lack thereof, the Ninth Circuit applied the Tenth Circuit’s test from U.S. Med.139  The Ninth 
Circuit further clarified that courts cannot assign non-statutory insider status to a creditor solely 
because courts may find that creditors and debtors have a close relationship.140 
 The Ninth Circuit found that the bankruptcy court did not clearly err in finding that Rabkin 
was not a non-statutory insider.141  The court observed that U.S. Bank had produced no evidence 
that Rabkin’s relationships with either Lakeridge or Bartlett were similar enough to those flagged 
                                                 
131 Lakeridge, 814 F.3d at 1003. 
132 Id. at 999-1000 
133 Id. 
134 Id. at 1000. 
135 Id. at 1003. 
136 Id. at 1001. 
137 Lakeridge, 814 F.3d at 1002. 
138 Id. (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6); Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 957 n.4 (9th Cir. 1998)). 
139 Lakeridge, 814 F.3d at 1001 (citing 531 F.3d 1272, 1277 (2008)). 
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by Congress in section 101(31) to warrant the kind of close scrutiny normally reserved for statutory 
insiders.142  In addition to crediting the bankruptcy court’s findings regarding the degree to which 
Rabkin and Bartlett exercised control over one another and their finances were intertwined,143 the 
court emphasized that “[n]othing in § 101(31) or case law indicates it would be improper for a 
debtor to sell, or even give, a claim to a friend if the friend is acting of his own volition and neither 
party is engaged in bad faith.”144  Finally, the court found that Rabkin purchased his interest in 
Lakeridge solely as a business investment, and behaved as reasonable business-person operating 
at arm’s length would.145 
 Judge Clifton concurred in part and dissented in part.146  Judge Clifton agreed with the 
majority to the extent that the majority found Rabkin was not a statutory insider.147  Judge Clifton 
did not agree with the majority, however, that Rabkin was not a non-statutory insider.148  Judge 
Clifton first looked to MBP’s motivation in entering into the transaction, finding ill-intent as 
MBP’s primary motivation was to hand the unsecured claim to a friendly party whom MBP could 
rely on to vote for the reorganization plan.149  Judge Clifton then looked into Rabkin’s 
motivations.150  He concluded that Rabkin “did a favor for a friend, and if it made some money for 
himself, so much the better.”151 
 Judge Clifton next determined whether, under the second prong of  the test, Rabkin and 
Bartlett conducted business at arm’s length.152  For Judge Clifton, the fact that Rabkin and Bartlett 
                                                 
142 Id. at 1002-03. 
143 Id. at 1003. 
144 Id. 
145 See id. 
146 Lakeridge, 814 F.3d at 1003 (Clifton, J., concurring and dissenting). 
147 Id. at 1004. 
148 Id. 
149 Id. 
150 Id. at 1004-05. 
151 Id. at 1005. 
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did not engage in any bargaining or negotiation was dispositive.153  According to  Judge Clifton, 
this alone “‘compels the conclusion’ that Rabkin and Bartlett’s relationship was ‘close enough to 
gain an advantage attributable simply to affinity rather than to the course of dealings between the 
parties,’”154 and make Rabkin a non-statutory insider.155  Finally, Judge Clifton took issue with the 
standard of review the majority applied to the bankruptcy court’s determinations, stating that the 
trial court’s determination of Rabkin’s legal status is a mixed question of fact and law, properly 
subject to de novo review.156 
 As stated in the introduction, U.S. Bank petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of 
certiorari, raising three questions for the Court to consider.157  The Supreme Court granted 
certiorari only as to the second question.  The next section of this Comment will lay out the 
substantive arguments advanced by the parties to the controversy, and the United States as amicus 
curiae. 
IV.  The Parties’ Arguments 
A.  The Petitioner’s Argument 
 The petitioner posited that all standard of review questions are divided into three 
categories: (1) issues of fact, which appellate courts review for clear error; (2) issues of law, which 
appellate courts review de novo; and (3) mixed issues of law and fact, the standard of review for 
which there is currently no consensus.158  According to the petitioner, the Supreme Court has 
defined mixed questions as questions in which “the historical facts are admitted or established, the 
                                                 
153 Id. 
154 Id. (quoting Rupp v. United Sec. Bank (In re Kunz), 489 F.3d 1072, 1079 (10th Cir. 2007)). 
155 Lakeridge, 814 F.3d at 1005 (Clifton, J., concurring and dissenting). 
156 Id. at 1006 (citing Murray v. Bammer (In re Bammer), 131 F.3d 788, 792 (9th Cir. 1997) (“Mixed questions 
presumptively are reviewed by us de novo because they require consideration of legal concepts and the exercise of 
judgment about the values that animate legal principles.”). 
157 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 12, at i. 
158 Brief for Petitioner at 23, U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Vill. at Lakeridge, 138 S. Ct. 960 (2018). 
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rule of law is undisputed, and the issue is whether the facts satisfy the statutory standard, or to put 
it another way, whether the rule of law as applied to the established facts is or is not violated.”159 
 Although the Ninth Circuit treated the term “insider” as invoking settled issues of law, the 
petitioner pointed out that the Bankruptcy Code never fixes a hard and fast definition of 
“insider.”160  The petitioner further alleged that the bankruptcy court necessarily made a number 
of legal determinations when interpreting the Ninth Circuit’s test for determining whether a party 
qualifies as a non-statutory insider.161  The factors that guided the bankruptcy court’s 
determination as to whether Rabkin was a non-statutory insider were not explicitly enumerated in 
prior Ninth Circuit jurisprudence, and the determination of which facts a bankruptcy court should 
consider in determining whether an individual or entity is a non-statutory insider is thus a question 
of law, not a question of historical fact.162  Because, the petitioner argued, the bankruptcy court 
formulated an idiosyncratic test for determining non-statutory insider status after reviewing other 
cases, this exercise was fundamentally a legal one.163 
 The petitioner observed that the majority of the other circuits (including the Third, Seventh, 
Tenth, and Eleventh), have held that this is a mixed question of law and fact subject to de novo 
review.164  The Fourth and Fifth Circuits agree with the Ninth Circuit, and review a bankruptcy 
court’s determination that a party qualifies as a non-statutory insider for clear error.165  The 
petitioner, however, argued that the proper standard of review in this case is de novo.166  The 
petitioner reached this conclusion by applying four tests which the Supreme Court has articulated 
                                                 
159 Id. at 26 (quoting Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 289 n.19 (1982)). 
160 Id. 
161 Id. 
162 Id. at 24. 
163 Id. at 33. 
164 Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 158, at 33. 
165 Id. at 31-32. 
166 See generally, id. 
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to determine when a mixed question of fact and law warrants de novo, as opposed to clear error, 
review.167 
 The first test mentioned by the petitioner is the “predominance of law or fact test.”168  
Under this test, “[t]he question often devolves to a simple matter of determining whether the legal 
question ‘is analytically more akin to a fact or a legal conclusion.’”169  This case, petitioner argued, 
wherein the issue of whether the lower court applied the proper standard is central, is properly 
considered predominantly legal, and is subject to de novo review.170  “Where trial courts must 
determine the norms that govern whether a party satisfies a particular legal status, such a question 
is primarily legal in nature and requires de novo review.”171 
 The petitioner relied on Miller v. Fenton, in which the Supreme Court was asked to 
determine whether, in a federal habeas corpus proceeding, a lower court’s determination of the 
voluntariness of a criminal confession is an issue of fact entitled to deference under the federal 
habeas statute as a finding of fact.172  Writing for the Court, Justice O’Connor focused on the 
mixed nature of the inquiry, implicating issues of law and of fact.173  The Court decided that the 
question was predominantly a legal one, as it involved issues of legislative intent and stare decisis, 
and “the voluntariness inquiry[] subsum[ed] . . . a complex of values . . . .”174 
 The second test applied by the petitioner is the historical test.175  The historical test calls 
for a two-part inquiry.  It first asks whether the controlling statute provides a clear indication as to 
                                                 
167 Id. at 36. 
168 Id. at 36-37. 
169 Id. at 37 (quoting Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 116 (1985)). 
170 Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 158, at 39. 
171 Id. at 40. 
172 474 U.S. 104, 105-06 (1985). 
173 See id. at 114-16. 
174 Id. at 115-16 (internal citation omitted). 
175 Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 158, at 42. 
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which standard of review is appropriate.176  If it does not, the Court proceeds to the second part, in 
which the Court looks the history of appellate practice, and confirms long-standing appellate 
practice.177  The petitioner argued that the historical practice in bankruptcy law is for appellate 
courts to recognize lower courts’ interpretations of undefined but fairly implied legal 
characterizations in the Bankruptcy Code as matters of statutory interpretation, and to subject them 
to de novo review.178  Therefore, it would be in keeping with the traditional practice of the appellate 
courts to apply de novo review to bankruptcy courts’ treatment of undefined terms in the 
Bankruptcy Code.179 
 The petitioner’s third test is the functional analysis test.180  This test is intended to assess 
whether, as an administrative matter, a particular actor within the judicial branch is better able to 
dispose of an issue in a particular case than another judicial actor.181  The petitioner argued that 
appellate courts are better suited to decide questions invoking norms and standards that animate 
and give substance to statutory interpretation.182  Because the application of the Ninth Circuit’s 
test for non-statutory insider status calls for statutory interpretation, imparts serious legal 
consequences, and does not call for factual determinations, the question is well-suited for 
disposition by the appellate courts.183  Although, again echoing Miller,184 the petitioner conceded 
that there are circumstances in which trial courts are better equipped to dispose of the issues than 
are appellate courts, the petitioner argued that nothing in the determination of insider-status 
                                                 
176 Id. 
177 Id. 
178 Id. 
179 Id. at 44. 
180 Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 158, at 45. 
181 Id. at 46 (quoting Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985)). 
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invokes the special provinces and duties of the lower courts.185  Conversely, the petitioner asserted 
appellate courts are, at the least, no less able than the lower courts to make such determinations on 
account of their inability to interact with witnesses, take testimony, and engage in other fact-
finding activities.186  The petitioner also stressed the need for uniformity in the interpretation of 
the Bankruptcy Code.187  In addition to pointing out that the Constitution itself calls for such 
uniformity,188 the petitioner argued that de novo review would discourage forum-shopping189 and 
encourage stability in other areas of bankruptcy law.190 
 The final test which the petitioner argued should lead the Court to adopt the de novo 
standard of review is the ultimate issue test.191  The ultimate issue test asks “whether the issue is 
dispositive of the broader question under consideration, i.e., whether it is an ‘ultimate issue’ that 
‘clearly impl[ies] the application of standards of law.’”192  Where legal issues are the ultimate 
issues, de novo review is proper.193  The petitioner argued that because the open-ended nature of 
an inquiry into insider status and the Ninth Circuit’s uncertain standard requires bankruptcy courts 
to engage in statutory interpretation and answer questions of law when conducting the inquiry, the 
inquiry is inherently legal or quasi-legal in nature.194 
 In making this argument, the petitioner relied on Pullman-Standard v. Swint and its 
discussion of Baumgartner v. United States.195  In Pullman-Standard, a Title VII discrimination 
                                                 
185 Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 158, at 50. 
186 See id. at 50-52. 
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188 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
189 See Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 158, at 49-50. 
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case, the district court had found no discriminatory intent on the part of the employer.196  The Fifth 
Circuit, however, reversed, finding that the differences in the terms of employment and working 
conditions for black workers and white workers at Pullman-Standard was a product of 
discriminatory intent.197  In reversing the district court, the Fifth Circuit distinguished what was 
purported to be the “ultimate fact,” did not apply the level of deference called for in Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 52(a)(6), and argued that it had authority under Baumgartner to conduct an 
independent, de novo review of the dispositive finding of fact.198  The Supreme Court, however, 
reversed, and chastised the Fifth Circuit, accusing that court of over-reading Baumgartner:  
Whatever Baumgartner may have meant by its discussion of “ultimate facts,” it 
surely did not mean that whenever the result in a case turns on a factual finding, an 
appellate court need not remain within the constraints of Rule 52(a).  
Baumgartner’s discussion of “ultimate facts referred not to pure findings of fact—
as we find discriminatory intent to be in this context—but to findings that “clearly 
[imply] the application of standards of law.”199 
 
The Court, however, did not provide an example of the true application of this test.200 
B.  The Respondent’s Argument 
 The respondent argued that a bankruptcy court’s determination that a party is a non-
statutory insider should be reviewed for clear error.201  The respondent argued that the 
determination that a party is a non-statutory insider is a question of fact, which itself turns on 
whether the transaction at issue was conducted at arm’s length.202  The answer to the secondary 
question is a factual one.203  The respondent also cited Miller for its own purposes, arguing that 
the ultimate issue of intent that the Court had characterized as a question of fact in Pullman-
                                                 
196 Baumgartner, 456 U.S. at 275. 
197 Id. (quoting Swint v. Pullman-Standard, 624 F.2d 525, 533-34 (5th Cir. 1980)). 
198 Id. at 286-88. 
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Standard was similar to the question of intent that the respondent believed was dispositive in 
determining whether Rabkin had dealt at arm’s length with Bartlett.204  The respondent also cited 
Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc. for the proposition that because a factual 
determination may nearly dispose of the case, that does not “render the subsidiary question a legal 
one.”205  The respondent did not analyze the case in terms of the four tests the petitioner outlined, 
arguing that there are not, as petitioner asserts, four different legal tests, but a single multi-part 
framework.206 
 The respondent argued that even if the Court found the question to be a mixed question of 
law and fact, appellate courts must still defer to the bankruptcy courts, and apply a more lenient 
standard of review.207  The respondent argued the petitioner was wrong insofar as the petitioner 
argued that any determination of non-statutory insider status is inherently a mixed question of law 
and fact.208  The respondent reiterated that once the bankruptcy court had made its finding of fact, 
“it automatically followed that Rabkin was not a non-statutory insider (since that fact is dispositive 
under the controlling standard).  As such, just as in Pullman-Standard, this is inherently a fact 
question, and it is subject to review for clear error.”209  The respondent further argued that the 
Ninth Circuit’s standard for determining non-statutory insider status is settled and clear, and 
required no interpretation by the bankruptcy court.210  Finally, the respondent argued that deference 
is due to trial courts for their special capacity to make findings of fact.211 
C.  The Amicus Curiae United States of America’s Arguments 
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 On October 3, 2016, the then-Acting Solicitor General was invited to file a brief expressing 
the views of the United States.212  The United States as amicus curiae supporting the respondent 
filed a brief on August 18, 2017.213  In it, the amicus urged caution and restraint, reminding the 
Court that “[d]etermining the proper standard of review . . . requires precise determination of the 
particular issue raised on appeal.”214  The United States asserted that mixed questions of fact and 
law are severable, and that questions of statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo while 
questions of fact are reviewed for clear error.215  The United States argued that the Supreme Court 
has distinguished between questions of law and questions of fact.216  The Supreme Court has 
routinely held that it is a court’s duty to define the appropriate standard, and the jury’s duty to find 
facts.217  The amicus curiae argued that a court’s need to define and apply a legal standard as part 
of its analysis does not mean that incidental or subsidiary findings of fact are to be treated as legal 
conclusions.218  A court does not need to apply a single standard of review to the entire case merely 
because the issues appear to be comingled, as appellate courts have long been able to distinguish 
between factual and legal matters.219 
 The amicus granted that an appellate court should review de novo the choice or articulation 
of the legal test or standard a bankruptcy court actually uses when determining if an individual or 
entity is a non-statutory insider.220  Because appellate courts are better suited to determine open-
ended issues of statutory interpretation, appellate courts should conduct de novo reviews of lower 
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courts’ statutory constructions.221  The United States, however, maintained that whether a 
transaction was conducted at arm’s length is a question of fact, the nature of which militates for 
clear-error review.222  For the purposes of the Bankruptcy Code, the motivation behind a party’s 
transactions is determinative of whether the transaction was conducted at arm’s length.223  The 
Supreme Court has recognized intent as a question of fact.224  The amicus agreed with the 
respondent when it argued that, under Miller and Teva Pharmaceuticals., the fact that a factual 
determination is dispositive does not transform it into a legal conclusion.225  The amicus also 
argued that the history of appellate practice indicates a preference for deferential review in cases 
such as this, where a bankruptcy court has determined that a party is a non-statutory insider.226   
D.  The Petitioner’s Response 
 The petitioner responded to the respondent’s and the amicus curiae’s arguments.227  The 
petitioner accused its adversaries of offering a facile solution—“[m]ixed questions of fact and law 
have divided the circuits and bedeviled courts and scholars precisely because they defy such easy 
answers.”228  A binary approach represents a false dichotomy as legal and factual issues are so 
intertwined.229  The petitioner also asserted that the respondents offer a false dichotomy as to the 
issue of mixed questions of fact and law.230  There is, in fact, a middle ground, as is recognized by 
                                                 
221 Id. at 16-17. 
222 Id. at 17. 
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224 Id. at 18 (citing Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 288 (1982)). 
225 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 213, at 14 (citing Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 113 
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the various legal tests the Supreme Court has devised to decide whether mixed questions should 
be uniformly subject to de novo review.231   
 The petitioner also accused its adversaries of moving the goalposts and changing the terms 
of the test the bankruptcy court and the Ninth Circuit applied in determining whether Rabkin was 
a non-statutory insider.232  The relevant question was whether the transaction was conducted at 
arm’s length.233  The adjectival phrase is meant to describe the transaction, and not the transactors’ 
states of mind.234  What’s more, the petitioner, argued, if the bankruptcy court’s inquiry were solely 
factual, and the test clear and settled, it would not have needed to scour the decisions of other 
courts in order to formulate its test.235  “The issue is whether the [b]ankruptcy [c]ourt’s selection 
of the relevant factors for determining non-statutory insider status (e.g., whether cohabitation or 
commingling of finances are foremost considerations) is normative and therefore reviewed de 
novo.”236  According to the petitioner, the respondents never refuted the petitioner’s central point 
that a court’s selection of the most relevant factors necessary for applying a broad standard such 
“arm’s length” is by definition normative, and therefore must be reviewed de novo.237  The 
petitioner reiterated its arguments from its earlier brief that the Constitution calls for uniformity in 
the field of bankruptcy law, and that the disparity between the circuits as to the definition of non-
statutory insider status is untenable.238 
V.  An Argument in Favor of a Sensible Division of Labor 
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 The respondent and United States as amicus curiae articulate the correct standard of review.  
As a preliminary matter, precisely on account of the difficulties to which the petitioner calls the 
Court’s attention, severance of the legal and factual components of a bankruptcy court’s decision 
to classify a party as a non-statutory insider is necessary in order for an appellate court to carry out 
an accurate and meaningful review.  As J. L. Clark observed long ago, 
I am unable to see the law and the fact from the same viewpoint nor at the same 
time.  They have their origin in different sources.  One is from the sovereign, the 
other from the subject.  They arise in different altitudes.  They may, and probably 
do flow through the same plain.  They intermingle, possibly, but they never mix.  
That is they do not blend or unite and form a new compound any more than water 
and the soil through which it flows mix.  The most that can be said of the mixture 
is that it is a hyphenated muddy water the result of a disturbed condition of things, 
which must settle back into its original elements of water and soil in order to 
become useful.239 
 
 In surveying the authorities, it is important to note that no per se rule governs whether 
mixed questions of law and fact are categorically reviewed de novo or for clear error.  The Supreme 
Court has held that simply describing as questions as “mixed” does not establish that it necessarily 
receives de novo review, and that there is no such rigid or categorical rule.240 
 How, then, are the appellate courts to proceed?  It is instructive to consider exactly what 
the appellate courts are reviewing when they examine a bankruptcy court’s finding that a party is 
a non-statutory insider.  In making that determination, a bankruptcy court carries out three tasks.  
First, the bankruptcy court makes findings of fact.  Second, the bankruptcy court reviews the law 
of the circuit in which the bankruptcy court sits, and fixes upon the legal status that will guide the 
court’s determination of the issues.  Third, the bankruptcy court applies the facts to the law.241 
                                                 
239 J.L. Clark, A Mixed Question of Law and Fact, 18 YALE L.J. 404, 405 (1909). 
240 Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 701 (1996). 
241 See, e.g., generally, In re Pioneer Carriers, LLC, No. 16-36356, 2018 WL 798876 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Feb. 8, 2018) 
(making findings of fact, fixing upon standard, and drawing conclusions therefrom); In re Litton, No.: 15-12871-JDW, 
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 How should the circuit courts of appeals review each of these judicial functions?  In the 
first category, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a)(6) appears to explicitly control—“Findings 
of fact, whether based on oral or other evidence, must not be set aside unless clearly erroneous . . 
. .”242  But, the petitioner asserts, this Rule does not apply uniformly to all findings of fact.243  The 
petitioner argues, citing precedent, that the Supreme Court has historically reserved a special place 
for questions of “ultimate fact,” subjecting them to de novo review.244  The petitioner maintains 
that this tradition is alive and well, and that federal appellate courts may conduct de novo review 
of findings of fact which necessarily compel a bankruptcy court’s determination.245  The petitioner, 
however, misstates the law.  Rule 52(a) “applies to findings of fact, including those described as 
‘ultimate facts’ because they may determine the outcome of litigation.”246  To be clear, the Rule 
“applies to both subsidiary and ultimate facts.”247  Therefore, even if a bankruptcy court applies a 
test such as the Ninth and Tenth Circuits’ which turns upon a finding of fact (namely that parties 
dealt at less than arm’s length), the circuit court reviewing the bankruptcy court’s findings of fact 
must subject those findings only to review for clear error.248 
 In the second category, the parties are unanimous that appellate courts may review a 
bankruptcy court’s identification and interpretation of controlling law de novo as a question of 
                                                 
242 FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6).  See also, e.g., Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2739 (2015) (“First, we review the 
District Court’s factual findings under the deferential ‘clear error’ standard.  This standard does not entitle us to 
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Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985)). 
243 Reply Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 15, at 20 (citing Bogardus v. Comm’r, 302 U.S. 34, 38-39 (1937); 
Helvering v. Tex-Penn Oil Co., 300 U.S. 481, 491 (1937)). 
244 Reply Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 15, at 20 (citing Bogardus, 302 U.S. at 338-39; Tex-Penn Oil Co., 300 
U.S. at 491. 
245 Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 158, at 52-53. 
246 Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 501 (1984) (citing Pullman-Standard v. Swint,, 456 
U.S. 273, 287 (1982)). 
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law.249  Little time need be spent here; the Supreme Court has spoken clearly.250  The Court has 
further stated that “[where] statutory terms are at issue, their interpretation is a question of law and 
it is the [appellate] court’s duty to define the appropriate standard.”251  As was discussed above, 
although the federal courts recognized the category of non-statutory insiders without explicit 
congressional instruction, such a category of persons, such a status, was fairly implied by the 
language of 11 U.S.C. § 101(31) and the Rule of Construction provided in section 102(3), and thus 
fairly inferred by the federal courts.  Therefore, it is an especially proper exercise of the appellate 
courts’ power to subject a bankruptcy court’s interpretation of case law to searching review. 
 With the exception of the alleged carve-out for ultimate facts, however, the foregoing 
sections are uncontroversial, and would likely be readily stipulated by the parties to this 
controversy.  Again, the controversy revolves around what the appellate courts are to do with 
mixed questions of fact and law.  The respondent and amicus curiae argue for the most utile and 
expeditious path of review—severance of a bankruptcy court’s factual and legal findings and 
application of the fact to the law, and independent review of each element.252 
 Before arguing for this course of action, the question must be answered—do appellate 
courts have the power to sever lower courts’ findings of facts from their legal conclusions, and 
those courts’ application of the found facts to the legal conclusions?  The Supreme Court has held 
that they do—“Courts of appeals have long found it possible to separate factual from legal 
matters.”253  This holds true in the bankruptcy context.  At least the Second, Third, and Seventh 
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Circuits have held that they can sever a bankruptcy court’s findings of fact from its legal 
determinations, and review them separately.254  What’s more, the Supreme Court has established 
that “the application-of-legal-standard-to-fact sort of question . . . , commonly called a ‘mixed 
question of law and fact,’ has typically been resolved by juries.”255  This too militates for clear 
error review. 
 In addition to abstract legal reasoning, substantive policy and the realities of the world also 
implicitly advocate for the determination of non-statutory insider status on a case-by-case basis.  
In Lakeridge, the Ninth Circuit’s authority for the proposition that a determination of non-statutory 
insider status is ultimately a question of fact reviewable for clear error derives from the Fifth 
Circuit’s decision in In re Missionary Baptist Foundation of America, Inc.256  There, the Fifth 
Circuit determined that clear error was the proper standard of review, even though it retained power 
to correct a lower court’s interpretation of the law through de novo review.257  In the case that 
incorporated the idea into Ninth Circuit jurisprudence, UVAS Farming Corp. v. Laviana 
Investments, N.V.,258 the bankruptcy court used the language of Missionary to bolster its argument 
that the facts upon which a court may find a party to be a non-statutory insider are exactly those—
facts.259  Because the analysis turned upon a finding of fact, it followed that the conclusion was 
likewise factual.260  Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit believed that clear review applied.261 
                                                 
254 Barclays Capital, Inc. v. Giddens (In re Lehman Brothers Holdings), 761 F.3d 303, 308 (2d Cir. 2014); Phoenician 
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 The District of New Mexico’s bankruptcy court also identified one of the important policies 
which advocate for clear error review: flexibility.262  Because legal issues do not arise in sterile 
classroom settings or terms, it is important that the bankruptcy courts have the ability and 
confidence to dispose of legal issues as they actually arise, without fearing excessive second-
guessing by the appellate courts.  The federal courts recognized the class of non-statutory insiders 
because they realized that Congress, by enumerating a few, necessarily left membership in the 
class open to those not on the congressional roll call.  Although the petitioner was correct to argue 
that uniformity is a key value called for in the Constitution in the field of bankruptcy law,263 under 
a severed standard of review, the circuit courts would still be afforded an opportunity to refine and 
clarify the controlling law but allow the bankruptcy courts to proceed expeditiously in the 
disposition of cases. 
 This second value, efficiency, would also be served by a severed standard, for two reasons.  
First, the process of appellate review would be streamlined if the appellate courts were required to 
closely review only a bankruptcy court’s legal findings, and not their factual ones.  Second, it is 
important to keep in mind that when a company or individual has declared bankruptcy, time is of 
the essence.  Especially in the case of a bankrupt company or entity, the bankrupt party’s assets 
dwindle and depreciate, and the creditors’ claims shrink in value accordingly.  The course of 
appellate review can run years.264  It is in the best interest of the creditors and the debtors, as well 
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as the judiciary, that the matters be settled quickly, while there is still money on the table.  A 
partitioned standard of review thus is in the interest of all the involved parties. 
 Finally, the text and the spirit of Rule 52(a) militate in favor of a split standard of review.  
Rule 52(a)(1) calls for a court sitting without a jury (as a bankruptcy court does) to “find the facts 
specially and state its conclusions of law separately.”265  A reviewing appellate court may apply a 
different standard of review to the trial court’s findings and conclusions, respectively.  This rule 
also plays an indispensable part in allocating the power and responsibility between trial and 
appellate courts.266  The Supreme Court, in construing this Rule, time and again has emphasized 
the irreplaceable advantage trial courts enjoy by having direct access to the evidence and being 
able to assess the demeanor, temper, and tics of live witnesses, in contrast to the disadvantage 
conferred by the cold records with which appellate courts are confronted.267   
 A partitioned standard of review would also ease the burden on appellate courts, and further 
enable them to carry out their indispensable function in developing substantive law.268  As 
Benjamin Cardozo wrote over 100 years ago, appellate courts exist not simply for the sake of 
“declaring justice between man and man, but . . . settling the law. . .   not for the individual litigant, 
but for the indefinite body of litigants, whose causes are potentially involved in the specific cause 
at issue.”269  Rule 52, in dividing the labor between the trial and appellate courts, facilitates the 
missions of each.  For at least three decades the Supreme Court has been of the opinion that even 
if Rule 52(a) allowed an appellate court to undertake a de novo review of a trial court’s findings 
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of fact, the contribution an appellate court would make towards the accurate establishment of 
historical would be negligible, come at a disproportionate cost of judicial resources, and 
delegitimize the trial courts.270  By calling for a partitioned standard of review, the Court may, in 
one action, bolster the legitimacy of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the trial courts, and relieve 
the burden on the appellate courts. 
VI. Conclusion 
 Although this controversy at first glance may seem arcane and to touch upon only a small 
part of a niche field of the law, a deeper analysis of this case reveals that this dispute can have a 
significant effect on the field of bankruptcy law and appellate review standards.  As the petitioner 
argued in the Petition for Certiorari, any decision the Supreme Court makes in this case has the 
potential to affect wide swaths of commercial law.  Companies may reorganize themselves based 
upon fears of extensive post-bankruptcy litigation should the Supreme Court hold that de novo 
review, rather than clear error review, is the appropriate standard.  The decision will also implicate 
current jurisprudence of statutory interpretation, and influence how appellate courts, attorneys, and 
scholars regard trial court’s necessary interpretation of statutory law when carrying out legal tests 
and applying facts to legal standards.  It will also impact how trial and appellate courts will 
interact—are the circuits to defer to the bankruptcy courts, or are the bankruptcy courts to operate 
under the watchful eyes of the circuits?  The circuits should defer to the bankruptcy courts, in order 
to facilitate the speedy and efficient disposition of bankruptcy disputes.  Although the petitioner is 
correct in arguing that uniformity and legal certainty are virtues unto themselves, such uniformity 
and certainty should not be pursued at the expense of justice and equity, which demand flexibility.  
The Supreme Court’s dicta in Hana Fin. v. Hana Bank271 also applies in the bankruptcy context.  
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“[D]ecisionmaking in fact-intensive disputes necessarily requires judgment calls.” 272  It is of no 
concern that similarly situated finders of fact may come to different conclusions when evaluating 
the same set of facts.  It is not enough to say that the unpredictability makes a situation untenable.273  
As Justice Holmes philosophically put it, “certainty generally is an illusion, and repose is not the 
destiny of man.”274  It is the strength, rather than the weakness, of the trial courts that they may be 
flexible.  The Supreme Court should recognize this and enable the bankruptcy courts.275 
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